When KrebsOnSecurity broke the information on Oct. 20, 2023 that identification and authentication large Okta had suffered a breach in its buyer help division, Okta stated the intrusion allowed hackers to steal delicate knowledge from fewer than one p.c of its 18,000+ clients. However at this time, Okta revised that influence assertion, saying the attackers additionally stole the identify and electronic mail deal with for practically all of its buyer help customers.
Okta acknowledged final month that for a number of weeks starting in late September 2023, intruders had entry to its buyer help case administration system. That entry allowed the hackers to steal authentication tokens from some Okta clients, which the attackers might then use to make adjustments to buyer accounts, similar to including or modifying approved customers.
In its preliminary incident studies in regards to the breach, Okta stated the hackers gained unauthorized entry to information inside Okta’s buyer help system related to 134 Okta clients, or lower than 1% of Okta’s buyer base.
However in an up to date assertion printed early this morning, Okta stated it decided the intruders additionally stole the names and electronic mail addresses of all Okta buyer help system customers.
“All Okta Workforce Identification Cloud (WIC) and Buyer Identification Resolution (CIS) clients are impacted besides clients in our FedRamp Excessive and DoD IL4 environments (these environments use a separate help system NOT accessed by the menace actor),” Okta’s advisory states. “The Auth0/CIC help case administration system was additionally not impacted by this incident.”
Okta stated that for practically 97 p.c of customers, the one contact data uncovered was full identify and electronic mail deal with. Which means about three p.c of Okta buyer help accounts had a number of of the next knowledge fields uncovered (along with electronic mail deal with and identify): final login; username; telephone quantity; SAML federation ID; firm identify; job position; person sort; date of final password change or reset.
Okta notes that a lot of the uncovered accounts belong to Okta directors — IT folks accountable for integrating Okta’s authentication expertise inside buyer environments — and that these people needs to be on guard for focused phishing assaults.
“Many customers of the client help system are Okta directors,” Okta identified. “It’s vital that these customers have multi-factor authentication (MFA) enrolled to guard not solely the client help system, but additionally to safe entry to their Okta admin console(s).”
Whereas it might appear utterly bonkers that some corporations enable their IT employees to function company-wide authentication techniques utilizing an Okta administrator account that isn’t protected with MFA, Okta stated totally six p.c of its clients (greater than 1,000) persist on this harmful follow.
In a earlier disclosure on Nov. 3, Okta blamed the intrusion on an worker who saved the credentials for a service account in Okta’s buyer help infrastructure to their private Google account, and stated it was probably these credentials had been stolen when the worker’s private machine utilizing the identical Google account was compromised.
In contrast to customary person accounts, that are accessed by people, service accounts are largely reserved for automating machine-to-machine capabilities, similar to performing knowledge backups or antivirus scans each night time at a specific time. For that reason, they will’t be locked down with multifactor authentication the best way person accounts can.
Dan Goodin over at Ars Technica reckons this explains why MFA wasn’t arrange on the compromised Okta service account. However as he rightly level out, if a transgression by a single worker breaches your community, you’re doing it flawed.
“Okta ought to have put entry controls in place apart from a easy password to restrict who or what might log in to the service account,” Goodin wrote on Nov. 4. “A technique of doing that is to place a restrict or circumstances on the IP addresses that may join. One other is to recurrently rotate entry tokens used to authenticate to service accounts. And, after all, it ought to have been inconceivable for workers to be logged in to private accounts on a piece machine. These and different precautions are the accountability of senior folks inside Okta.”
Goodin urged that individuals who need to delve additional into numerous approaches for securing service accounts ought to learn this thread on Mastodon.
“A good variety of the contributions come from safety professionals with intensive expertise working in delicate cloud environments,” Goodin wrote.